Andy Burnham’s refusal to pay slavery reparations answers a question about today’s taxpayers, but leaves another unresolved: why should anyone retain wealth derived from slavery simply because they did not commit the original crime?

The prime minister is joining the King at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Antigua, attended by representatives of 56 countries. His government is opening talks about a formal British apology for the slave trade, potentially next year, and proposing a “debt reset” for Commonwealth countries facing rising interest costs. Financial reparations remain ruled out.

Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband rejects asking British taxpayers to pay for historic acts, describing financial reparations as neither right nor feasible. The strongest version of that objection is substantial: nationality alone does not establish that someone inherited a benefit, and an indiscriminate bill could charge people with no demonstrated connection to the wealth at issue.

But that does not answer the inherited-benefit argument. If a father steals a car, dies and leaves it to his child, the child’s innocence does not justify keeping it against the victim’s claim. Returning the car, or compensating its owner, addresses possession of the proceeds rather than guilt for the theft. The same moral principle applies where wealth inherited from crimes against humanity remains identifiable: death cannot automatically erase the obligation while leaving the benefit intact.

The analogy establishes no legal finding about any modern asset. Its hardest test is tracing the connection. Across generations, property changes hands, wealth becomes mixed, and identifying beneficiaries, recipients and amounts becomes difficult. No particular family’s asset history or quantified continuing benefit is established here. A moral principle cannot supply those missing facts.

Yet difficulty establishing a claim is not proof that no claim can succeed. Evidence of retained benefit would support a targeted demand without establishing every taxpayer’s liability. The objection narrows who could properly be asked to pay; it does not justify ruling out restitution regardless of what evidence emerges.

Burnham’s debt proposal deserves the same scrutiny. Relief could ease immediate financial pressures, but assistance is not automatically compensation. Its terms, recipients and connection to historical losses would determine whether it fulfils any reparative obligation.

Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch opposes an apology because it could invite financial demands. That prospect establishes neither their justice nor their injustice; an apology alone would establish no amount owed.

The government can reasonably reject a bill based merely on citizenship. A blanket refusal faces a different test: where a continuing benefit from slavery is established, what justifies keeping it without restitution?