Quote of the day
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.
Published in London in 1748 in Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Of Miracles, as part of an argument about testimony; the precise circumstances of composition are unknown.
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A rule for measured belief
Hume’s sentence is his own philosophical exposition, not a fictional character’s speech. It appears in Part I of Section X, Of Miracles. The connective ‘therefore’ matters: this is the conclusion of an argument about experience, rather than a freestanding recommendation to be sensible.
Immediately beforehand, Hume considers expectations about the weather. Experience reasonably leads us to expect better weather in June than December, yet supplies no guarantee. Where experience is consistent, confidence may be strong; where it varies, judgement should be correspondingly reserved. Wisdom consists in adjusting the strength of belief, not demanding certainty on every occasion.
Testimony under examination
Hume then applies this principle to reports supplied by other people, especially accounts of miracles. Contradictions, witnesses’ character and interests, and the extent to which an event departs from ordinary experience all enter the reckoning. Testimony deserves scrutiny, not automatic deference.
The crucial comparison is between the credibility of the miraculous event and that of deception or mistake in its telling. This is not simply a declaration that miracles are logically impossible. Hume is examining what testimony can establish; both the interpretation and the success of his argument remain disputed.
A distinctly Scottish legacy
Born in Edinburgh, David Hume (1711–1776) was a Scottish philosopher, essayist and historian, central to the Scottish Enlightenment. His major works include A Treatise of Human Nature, the two Enquiries and the six-volume History of England. The familiar title An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding dates from 1758, rather than the book’s first appearance in 1748.
His histories and essays enjoyed greater contemporary popularity than his philosophy. His enduring philosophical reputation rests on investigations of knowledge, causation, morality, human psychology and religion. His place in Britain’s intellectual heritage is therefore distinctly Scottish and considerably broader than this celebrated sentence: he made the workings—and limitations—of human judgement a subject of lasting consequence.