Former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has warned that Australia could spend hundreds of billions of dollars on AUKUS and still fail to receive the nuclear-powered submarines at the heart of the agreement.

Appearing before an independent public inquiry into the pact, Turnbull described AUKUS as a "colossal mistake" and argued that both the United States and Britain face industrial constraints serious enough to threaten Australia's submarine plans.

He said there was "every indication" that Australia might not ultimately receive the capability it has been promised.

Turnbull's central concern is that Australia's plan depends on submarine industries it does not control.

Under the current AUKUS pathway, Australia is expected first to acquire three existing Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from the United States beginning in the early 2030s.

It would then transition to the jointly developed SSN-AUKUS design, with the first Australian-built boat scheduled to enter service in the early 2040s.

The Australian submarines are intended to be constructed at Osborne in South Australia rather than delivered as completed vessels from Britain.

Britain is nevertheless critical to the programme because SSN-AUKUS is based on a British design and British industry will supply nuclear propulsion systems and other major components.

That distinction makes claims that Britain has simply promised to build and hand Australia complete submarines misleading.

The larger risk identified by Turnbull is that Australia's timetable depends on the ability of British and American shipyards to expand production while simultaneously meeting the needs of their own navies.

If either industrial base falls substantially behind, Australia's transition from its ageing Collins-class submarines could become much more difficult.

The most immediate pressure is in the United States.

American shipyards have been procuring Virginia-class submarines at a nominal rate of about two each year but have recently been completing only around 1.1 to 1.2 boats annually because of workforce shortages, supply-chain constraints and production delays.

U.S. Navy assessments have previously projected delays of two to three years on some Virginia-class deliveries.

The United States also has to protect the size and readiness of its own attack-submarine fleet, and American law requires safeguards before submarines can be transferred to Australia.

Those realities are why critics question whether Washington will ultimately be willing and able to release three boats from its own fleet.

The three AUKUS governments have responded by modifying the acquisition plan.

In May, Australia, Britain and the United States announced a proposed approach under which Australia would receive three in-service Virginia-class submarines rather than the earlier mixture of used and newly built boats.

Australian officials argue that this simplifies maintenance, training and supply arrangements.

Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy said in June that the first Virginia-class submarine remained scheduled for the early 2030s and that every major AUKUS milestone had so far been met.

Turnbull is equally sceptical about Britain.

He has repeatedly described the British submarine-building industry as being in "disarray" and argues that the United Kingdom faces its own formidable challenge replacing and expanding the Royal Navy's attack-submarine fleet while supporting Australia's programme.

Britain rejects that assessment.

The Ministry of Defence says it remains fully committed to SSN-AUKUS and is investing heavily in BAE Systems' Barrow-in-Furness shipyard and Rolls-Royce's nuclear-submarine facilities in Derby.

The UK plans eventually to operate as many as 12 SSN-AUKUS attack submarines, replacing the Royal Navy's seven-boat Astute-class fleet.

The government says investment in Barrow should support continuous submarine production at an eventual rate of roughly one boat every 18 months.

Employment at the BAE Systems submarine yard has already risen from fewer than 11,000 workers in 2023 to about 13,500, with further expansion planned.

Steel for Britain's first SSN-AUKUS is expected to be cut in 2027. Those investments demonstrate that additional capacity is being built, but they do not eliminate the execution risk inherent in simultaneously expanding Britain's own fleet and supplying critical systems for Australia.

There is already tangible work under way on Australia's submarines.

Canberra announced a payment of 310 million Australian dollars in February for long-lead British components, including parts of the nuclear propulsion systems for Australia's first two SSN-AUKUS boats.

Rolls-Royce has begun work associated with those propulsion systems, while Australia is spending billions of dollars constructing the new nuclear-submarine shipyard at Osborne.

Submarine Rotational Force-West, under which American and British nuclear-powered submarines will operate from HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, is scheduled to begin in 2027. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}

The financial stakes are immense.

Australia's official long-term estimate for the nuclear-submarine programme has commonly been cited at between 268 billion and 368 billion Australian dollars through the mid-2050s.

That figure covers far more than the purchase of three American submarines: it includes construction of Australian shipyards, development and production of SSN-AUKUS, workforce expansion, infrastructure, maintenance and decades of operating costs.

Turnbull argues that committing such sums before the availability of the American and British industrial capacity is assured represents an unacceptable strategic risk.

His criticism also reflects a broader argument about Australian sovereignty.

Turnbull says Canberra has made its future submarine force dependent on decisions in Washington and London and has become more strategically reliant on the United States at a time when he considers American policy under President Donald Trump less predictable.

He has argued that Australia should not have cancelled the conventionally powered submarine programme it had previously agreed with France.

The current Australian government rejects that reasoning, maintaining that nuclear-powered submarines provide the range, endurance and survivability required for the country's future security environment.

The inquiry at which Turnbull gave evidence is not a government or parliamentary investigation.

It is an independent, crowdfunded public inquiry led by former federal minister Peter Garrett and other commissioners, established by critics and concerned citizens who argue that a project of AUKUS's scale has received insufficient public scrutiny.

It has taken hundreds of submissions and testimony from former ministers, military figures, academics and community organisations.

For now, Turnbull's prediction that Australia may receive no submarines remains a warning rather than an established outcome.

The official programme continues to meet its publicly announced milestones: the rotational submarine presence is scheduled to begin in Western Australia in 2027, the first American Virginia-class boat is planned for the early 2030s, Australian construction of SSN-AUKUS is due to begin before the end of this decade, and the first Australian-built submarine is targeted for the early 2040s.

The decisive test will be whether American and British submarine production can expand quickly enough to turn those schedules into actual boats.