GAO Report Identifies Major Failures by Secret Service Ahead of Trump Rally Shooting
Watchdog finds senior agents withheld classified threat intelligence days before Butler, Pennsylvania attempt; six agents suspended
A new Government Accountability Office report reveals serious lapses by the U.S. Secret Service in the lead-up to the July 13, 2024 assassination attempt on then-presidential candidate Donald Trump at a rally near Butler, Pennsylvania.
The agency reportedly received classified intelligence about a potential threat ten days before the rally but did not share the information with the field office, advance team, or local law enforcement, citing “compartmentalized practices” that limited dissemination unless a threat was deemed imminent .
The report also highlights further security shortcomings, including the assignment of an inexperienced site agent responsible for vulnerability assessments at a large outdoor event, malfunctioning drones, and communication failures among agencies .
In addition, local officers reportedly observed the shooter on a rooftop more than ninety minutes before gunfire erupted and alerted federal partners, but no preventative action followed .
The attempted assassination wounded Trump with a grazing shot to his upper right ear, killed volunteer firefighter Corey Comperatore, and injured two others before a Secret Service counter‑sniper neutralized the shooter .
Following the incident, six Secret Service agents received suspensions ranging from ten to forty‑two days, although no firings were reported .
The agency’s director stated reforms and implementation of GAO recommendations are already underway .
The shooting spurred congressional scrutiny.
A bipartisan Senate committee and a House task force both issued interim findings concluding that the attack was preventable, identifying failures in perimeter security, resource allocation, coordination, and communication protocols .
Further investigation by the FBI determined that the shooter, twenty‑year‑old Thomas Matthew Crooks, acted alone and had no links to foreign actors .
The GAO report underscores critical deficiencies in Secret Service procedures and recommends expanded intelligence sharing, improved training, and enhanced operational coordination to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future protective missions.
The agency reportedly received classified intelligence about a potential threat ten days before the rally but did not share the information with the field office, advance team, or local law enforcement, citing “compartmentalized practices” that limited dissemination unless a threat was deemed imminent .
The report also highlights further security shortcomings, including the assignment of an inexperienced site agent responsible for vulnerability assessments at a large outdoor event, malfunctioning drones, and communication failures among agencies .
In addition, local officers reportedly observed the shooter on a rooftop more than ninety minutes before gunfire erupted and alerted federal partners, but no preventative action followed .
The attempted assassination wounded Trump with a grazing shot to his upper right ear, killed volunteer firefighter Corey Comperatore, and injured two others before a Secret Service counter‑sniper neutralized the shooter .
Following the incident, six Secret Service agents received suspensions ranging from ten to forty‑two days, although no firings were reported .
The agency’s director stated reforms and implementation of GAO recommendations are already underway .
The shooting spurred congressional scrutiny.
A bipartisan Senate committee and a House task force both issued interim findings concluding that the attack was preventable, identifying failures in perimeter security, resource allocation, coordination, and communication protocols .
Further investigation by the FBI determined that the shooter, twenty‑year‑old Thomas Matthew Crooks, acted alone and had no links to foreign actors .
The GAO report underscores critical deficiencies in Secret Service procedures and recommends expanded intelligence sharing, improved training, and enhanced operational coordination to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future protective missions.
